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Abstract
This review essay looks at the recent books on the British Industrial Revolution by Robert
Allen and Joel Mokyr. Both writers seek to explain Britain’s primacy. This paper offers a
critical but sympathetic account of the main arguments of the two authors considering both
the economic logic and the empirical validity of their rival claims. In each case, the ideas are
promising but the evidence base seems in need of further support. It may be that eventually
these explanations for British economic leadership at the turn of the nineteenth century are
recognized as complementary rather than competing.
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1Introduction
New books by Robert Allen (2009a) and Joel Mokyr (2009) contain important, but
competing, reinterpretations of the British Industrial Revolution. They share common ground
in placing the explanation of sustained acceleration in technological progress at the heart of
the story. They differ, however, on the reasons for this. Allen stresses that the new
technologies were invented in Britain because they were profitable there but not elsewhere
while Mokyr sees the Enlightenment as highly significant and underestimated by previous
scholars. Each thinks that the other’s argument is flawed.
This review essay seeks first to set out the claims of the two authors and to place them in
some historiographic context, and then to evaluate them. The tone will, I hope, be one of
sympathetic criticism. The task of explaining why the first industrial revolution took place in
Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is far from trivial, indeed, it has
been thought of in the past as akin to a search for the Holy Grail. The endeavour undertaken
by Allen and Mokyr is most welcome, inter alia, as an antidote to the fashionable approach of
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005) which treats the industrial revolution either as
essentially a scale effect or as the outcome of some Darwinian selection process. Taking
technological change seriously must be the hallmark of an economic historian’s perspective
on the transition to modern economic growth and these two authors have over some decades
been established at the top of the premier league as analysts of the economic history of
technology.
Allen’s Argument and Mokyr’s Objections
Allen’s explanation for the time and place of the first industrial revolution can be summarized
as follows. He concentrates on examining what stimulated the technological breakthroughs
associated with famous inventions which then triggered off sequences of technological
progress (p. 135). His conclusion is deceptively simple: “The Industrial Revolution, in short,
was invented in Britain in the eighteenth century because it paid to invent it there” (p. 2).
This bottom line is reached in several steps. First, it is stressed that “Britain’s unique price
and wage structure was the pivot around which the Industrial Revolution turned” (p. 15). In
particular, international comparisons show Britain had relatively high wages but cheap capital
and very cheap energy. Second, Allen points to the high fixed costs of developing ‘macro-
inventions’ into commercially viable technologies through research and development; he
argues that these will only be incurred where the technology is profitable to adopt, a decision
which turns on relative factor prices, and where the market is big enough that success in
perfecting the technology will deliver enough sales to reward the proprietor (pp. 141-142,
151-154). Third, the profitability of adopting several inventions including the spinning
jenny, Arkwright’s mill, and coke smelting is examined with the result in each case that
adoption is rational at British but not at French prices (ch. 8, 9). Fourth, these technologies
are improved markedly through time in a process of micro-invention which is Hicks-neutral
rather than labour-saving and eventually means that it is rational for them to diffuse widely
across the rest of the world. This ‘tipping point’ was typically reached some decades later
2and then British competitive advantage was lost (pp. 154-155). Fifth, it is recognized that a
favourable configuration of prices and wages would not be sufficient to deliver the industrial
revolution. Allen accepts that “factors touching on the supply of inventors may explain why
the Industrial Revolution happened in 1800 rather than 1400” (pp. 268-269); he notes that a
cultural revolution had happened in the meantime and that, by the latter date, the British
economy had a much greater level of human capital (p. 12).
Although Allen provides much greater detail and conceptual sophistication, in essence, this
argument is not new. Earlier vintages tended to talk in terms of the role of ‘shortages’ in
inducing technological progress and to note that Britain differed from its rivals in this regard.
For example, Peter Mathias wrote that “It is a commonplace to remark that Britain had been
fortunate in her scarcities” (1979, p. 8) while Francois Crouzet (1990) provided a lengthy
review of the factor scarcity hypothesis with which he clearly sympathized but for which he
could not quite provide a clinching justification. Nevertheless, the construction in the past
decade of the extensive datasets that clearly establish Britain as a high-wage economy in the
context of Asia-Europe comparisons has thrown new light on these issues and returned them
to centre stage, as is underlined by recent research by Stephen Broadberry and Bishnupriya
Gupta (2009) on competitive advantage in cotton textiles. Allen himself acknowledges an
intellectual debt to H. J. Habakkuk (1962) and sees eighteenth-century Britain as “the prequel
to nineteenth-century America” (p. 15). Moreover, as he points out, his approach to micro-
inventions is based on the localized-learning formulation of the Habakkuk hypothesis about
the role of relative factor prices in promoting labour-saving technological progress in
nineteenth-century America developed by Paul David (1975).
While he accepts that the basic assumption that inventive activity was driven by a desire to
make money, Mokyr devotes several pages, comprising both theoretical and empirical
objections, to a direct rebuttal of Allen’s arguments. Mokyr makes three main points. First,
in the tradition of W. E. G. Salter’s (1960) critique of Sir John Hicks (1932), he notes that, in
the search for new techniques, firms will try to save all costs not just those of relatively
expensive factors (pp. 268-269). Second, he claims that there is little evidence to support the
view that technological progress exhibited a labour-saving bias overall either in terms of its
macroeconomic footprint or the evidence from patents compiled by Christine Macleod (1988)
which suggest that, even at the end of the eighteenth century, only 21 per cent of inventions
could be classified as intended to save labour (p. 269, 271). Third, at most relative factor
prices may determine the direction of technological change rather than the intensity of
innovative effort which depended on technological capabilities and was constrained by the
availability of useful knowledge (p. 270, 272).
Mokyr’s Argument and Allen’s Objections
Mokyr conceptualizes the Industrial Revolution as “the set of events that placed technology
in the position of the main engine of economic change” (p. 5). His aim is to explain this
phenomenon. He sums up his thesis as follows: “Britain became the leader of the Industrial
Revolution because, more than any other European economy, it was able to take advantage of
its endowment of human and physical resources thanks to the great synergy of the
3Enlightenment: the combination of the Baconian program in useful knowledge and the
recognition that better institutions created better incentives” (p. 122).
Mokyr suggests that what was needed to generate an industrial revolution was the right
combination of useful knowledge generated by scientists, engineers and inventors to be
exploited by a supply of skilled craftsmen in an institutional environment that produced the
correct incentives for entrepreneurs (p. 116). He believes that Britain’s advantages must have
been on the supply rather than the demand side of the economy since the Netherlands was
richer, France was larger, and Spain had more colonies (p. 99). In this regard, the
Enlightenment is seen as having two favourable effects in terms of improving both
technological capabilities and also institutional quality. The Baconian program comprised
research based on experimentation and scientific method, directing the research agenda to
focus on solving practical problems, and making the results widely accessible by organization
and dissemination of knowledge (p. 40). Mokyr acknowledges that the impact of the
Enlightenment on institutions is hard to quantify but argues that the success of its ideology
reduced rent-seeking and promoted competitive markets (p. 63). It was manifested in terms
of legislation such as the abolition of the Corn Laws but also strengthened informal
institutions in the form of social norms that favoured gentlemanly capitalism rather than
opportunistic behaviour (ch. 16).
Here too, it is easy to point to precursors in the historiography but, in this case, of the
components of the argument rather than the synthesis highlighting the role of ideology that is
constructed by Mokyr. The links between scientific thought and the industrial revolution
were underlined by T. S. Ashton (1948), extensively documented in A. E. Musson and Eric
Robinson (1969) and put into perspective by Mathias (1979) who anticipated Mokyr’s
emphasis on scientific attitudes rather than scientific knowledge. Recent cliometric work by
Joerg Baten and Jan-Luiten van Zanden (2008) has found that the growth of book production
had a positive effect on European economic growth in the pre- and early-industrial period.
Similarly, the role played by gentlemanly capitalism in reducing transactions costs was
promulgated by Peter Cain and Antony Hopkins (1993), while Daniel Bogart and Gary
Richardson (2008) have catalogued the role of parliament as a force for institutional
adaptability that promoted more efficient markets, and the emphasis on belief systems as a
major influence on institutions, especially informal institutions, echoes Douglass North
(2005).
Allen devotes chapter 10 of his book to rejecting Mokyr’s ‘industrial-enlightenment model’
of invention using a sample of 79 inventors of whom 10 created macro-inventions that drove
the industrial revolution.1 First, Allen investigates the links of these people with
Enlightenment science and finds that these were present for about half but that while this was
quite general in the case of steam but it was infrequent for textiles or metals which had much
greater economic impact: “using that yardstick, the Industrial Enlightenment did not matter
much” (p. 252). Second, Allen considers whether the inventors came from the upper class as
1 These 10 are Richard Arkwright, Edmund Cartwright, Samuel Crompton, Henry Cort, Abraham Darby, James
Hargreaves, Thomas Newcomen, John Smeaton, James Watt and Josiah Wedgwood.
4he contends the Enlightenment model predicts. There is some support for this, in particular,
merchants, lawyers and capitalists made up 4.6 per cent of the population but 32.8 per cent of
the inventors (p. 259); however, at the same time, the fathers of many inventors were artisans.
Third, Allen looks at inventors as experimenters; he finds that “Experimentation was ... the
common feature that characterized eighteenth-century inventors” (p. 255) but sees this as
nothing new and takes any increases in the volume of experimentation to be more a
consequence of better education than the Enlightenment per se (pp. 257, 267). Interestingly,
Allen says nothing about the impact of the Enlightenment on institutions or economic reform.
Presumably, this is because he considers institutional quality to be unimportant as a reason
for English primacy in the Industrial Revolution (pp. 5, 15, 125).
Assessment
The Role of Relative Factor Prices
This deserves to be examined in terms both of what modern economic theory has to say and
also with regard to the details of the empirical evidence. Taking an approach based on the
endogenous-innovation school of new growth economics makes a difference. But while this
provides a solid theoretical underpinning for a labour-scarcity hypothesis about the bias and
the rate of technological progress it also highlights the need for clarification as to what the
key differences were between Britain and other countries. Then, the weight of the evidence
put forward by Allen to support his claims can be assessed.
The model set out by Daron Acemoglu (2002) predicts the direction of technical change in a
setting where suppliers of different types of new technology respond to market signals. In his
model, relative-price and market-size effects both matter; the former creates incentives to
develop techniques used in the production of goods that use more expensive factors of
production and the latter to invent technologies that have a larger market, i.e., use the more
abundant factor. The net effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between factors. The
importance of the market size effect can be understood in terms of expected profitability in
the context of incurring fixed costs in development of a new technology.2 Acemoglu (2009)
extends this analysis to consider the impact of labour scarcity on the rate, rather than the bias,
of technological progress. The key result is that this effect is positive if technological change
is strongly labour-saving, i.e., it reduces the marginal product of labour.3
Thus, notwithstanding Mokyr’s dismissive reaction, Allen’s analysis is theoretically
defensible and his emphasis on the costs of development of a technology goes with the flow
of recent growth economics. In the spirit of Acemoglu’s model, the decision to incur the
development costs for the technologies that were central to the industrial revolution would be
predicted to depend on the number of potential adopters. In turn, this would depend both on
2 This puts Hicks’s (1932) conjecture on a firm foundation. It should also be noted that in this model, in
general, technical change is biased towards factors that become relatively more abundant in the sense that, at
constant factor proportions, its relative marginal product will be increased.
3
 Technology is strongly labour saving if in the production function Y= f(L, Z, θ), where θ is a vector of 
technologies where an increase in any component raises output, there are decreasing differences in θ and L.  
This might be where machines replace tasks previously undertaken by labour as in Joseph Zeira (1998).
5whether it was profitable for firms to adopt the technology, given factor prices, and also on
how many firms were in the market, as Allen points out (pp. 152-3). Either relative factor
prices or market size might undermine the viability of developing the technology and it
would be nice to distinguish clearly between the two. Let us review Allen’s evidence with
this in mind.
Allen considers the profitability of adopting the spinning jenny in detail (pp. 185, 194-195,
213-215). He compares savings in wages with the cost of the jenny and finds that the rate of
return around 1780 was 38 per cent in England, compared with a required rate of return
assumed to be 15 per cent, but only 2.5 per cent in France and minus 5.2 per cent in India.
England’s advantage over France accrues both from higher wages and cheaper jennies in the
former. Allen’s calculations are reported in Table 1 together with some further permutations.
Several interesting points emerge from Table 1. First, at the English price, the jenny would
be profitable at French wages. It is incorrect to say that low wages were the reason the
French did not use the jenny. Indeed, at the French jenny price, adoption would not have
been profitable at English wages. Second, it looks very profitable to invent and adopt the
jenny in America.4 So, perhaps it is really the small size of the market there that is the
obstacle, as Allen seems to suggest (p. 41), or perhaps human capital is inadequate (p. 212).5
Third, in England, the jenny would have been profitable at wages of 3.75d (60 per cent of the
figure used by Allen). Based on Allen’s wage and prices dataset, this implies that it had been
profitable since 1650, over a century before Hargreaves’s invention. Fourth, it should also be
noted that the rate of return is quite sensitive to the utilization assumptions.6 If it is assumed
that the jenny would be in use for half the day on 300 days of the year rather than 40 per cent
of the day on 250 days, as assumed by Allen, then ΔL = 100 and the rate of return in France 
becomes 18 per cent while it would have been profitable with English wages at 2.51d (40 per
cent of Allen’s wage rate).
Overall, Allen’s headline story that the combination of high wages and cheap coal was the
key to inventing the industrial revolution seems a bit too bold. Market size may well matter
and coal does not come into it in the important case of the breakthroughs in cotton-textile
technology; devoting some effort to quantifying market size would be valuable. The delay in
inventing the jenny, although it appears that it would have been profitable long before the
1760s, and the questionable robustness of the rate-of-return calculations add to the sense that
the argument is oversold. More work on similar calculations for the other inventions would
strengthen Allen’s claims.
Macro- and Micro-Inventions
4 This also seems to be true of the Arkwright mill. Using a procedure analogous to that used by Allen (2009, pp.
215-216) based on American wages divided by American jenny costs relative to English wages divided by
English jenny costs (= 1.049), I calculate that the potential rate of return on the Arkwright mill in Philadelphia
was 32.5 per cent.
5 Allen makes a similar point about the invention of the steam engine; in comparing England and Belgium, he
appeals to the small size of the Belgian coal industry rather than relative factor prices as Belgium’s key
disadvantage.
6 I am grateful to John Lyons for making the point to me that Allen’s utilization rates appear very low.
6Both Allen and Mokyr use the terminology of ‘macro-inventions’ and ‘micro-inventions’ and
this distinction is not only valuable in thinking about technological change in the industrial
Revolution but it also has implications in terms of the evidence for their rival interpretations.
To avoid serious confusion, however, it is important to recognize that they use different
definitions of these terms.
The Enlightened Economy continues in the tradition of Mokyr (1990) where macro-
inventions are radical new ideas without clear precedent that emerge more or less ab nihilo
with potentially dramatic effects. The industrial revolution was notable for a cluster of such
inventions. Micro-inventions represent the development stage which turns the original
invention into a viable business proposition (Mokyr, 2002, p. 48, 105) and the continuous
flow of incremental improvements that made the new techniques work better (Mokyr, 2009,
p. 81). In other words, micro-inventions are a combination of research and development and
learning by doing/using. Mokyr sees macro-inventions as only weakly, if at all, related to
economic forces but the process of micro-invention is responsive to economic incentives
(1990, p. 295). Micro-inventions are far more frequent and account for the lion’s share of
productivity gains (Mokyr, 1990, p. 13).
Allen also sees macro-inventions as important breakthroughs that give rise to long trajectories
of advance but, for him, a key characteristic is that they radically changed factor proportions,
and in the case of the industrial revolution were labour-saving (p. 136). To perfect a macro-
invention to the point where it is commercially viable requires a great deal of perspiration
(and expense) and this explains why macro-invention is biased and sensitive to relative factor
prices (p. 141). Micro-invention is the process of localized learning after the technology has
been introduced and this is neutral rather than prone to a factor-saving bias. Allen thinks in
terms of a diagram introduced by David (1975) and reproduced here as Figure 1. The process
of macro-invention makes point C possible, which will only appeal to the country with the P1
relative factor prices, but then learning generates movement down the α ray. 
If we think of sequence which comprises three phases which are 1) idea → 2) R & D 
including substantial development expenditure → 3) incremental improvement, then Allen 
considers 1) and 2) as ‘macro-invention’ and 3) as ‘micro-invention’ whereas for Mokyr 1) is
‘macro-invention’ while 2) and 3) are both aspects of ‘micro-invention’. The different
treatment of Development explains why for Allen macro but not micro invention is sensitive
to price signals but for Mokyr the opposite is the case. Adopting a common convention on
terminology could eliminate this apparent discrepancy and allow the two approaches to be
combined. Then the big difference between the two authors would concern their hypotheses
about the major influences on the successful development of new technology (phase 2).7
If micro-invention is central to technological advance especially with regard to realizing its
productivity potential, then, if the Industrial Enlightenment hypothesis is to carry weight, it
must explain why it entails a substantial impact on micro-invention. Indeed, this is central to
Mokyr’s argument. He maintains that micro-invention required a great deal of pragmatic and
7 Their hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and the real argument may be about their relative importance.
7informal knowledge and a systematic method of experimentation (2002, p. 48), that at the
heart of the process were anonymous craftsmen who investigated what worked and what did
not work (2009, p. 44), and that a major contribution came from reduced access costs to
useful knowledge. The human capital of the workforce then gave Britain a comparative
advantage in micro-invention (2009, p.113).
Several points arise from this with regard to attempts to test Mokyr’s hypothesis. First,
Allen’s focus on the origins and contacts of the macro-inventors is at best a partial test or, at
worst, misplaced and the very anonymity of micro-invention makes quantitative investigation
of the craftsmen’s role impossible. Second, if artisanal micro-invention is important, the
connections of this with the Enlightenment remain somewhat elusive and, at best, indirect, as
Mokyr admits (2009, pp. 57-61). Third, the notion of lower access costs to knowledge as a
stimulus to micro-invention during the industrial revolution is attractive but again remains to
be quantified and may be the result of the spread of tacit knowledge through the factory
system or urbanization rather than the availability of technical manuals or the activities of
scientific societies.
The notion of micro-invention embodied in Figure 1 has implications for the identification of
labour-saving bias in technological progress. If there is movement towards the origin down
the α ray, then the cumulative effect of these locally-neutral improvements is to impart a 
labour-saving bias to the shape of the isoquant. (Indeed, this is exactly what David had in
mind (1975, p. 59) when he devised this set-up as a solution to the problems posed by the
Habakkuk debate). However, in this case, there is no reason to expect that the associated
patent citations will on average exhibit claims of labour saving. Indeed, following Moses
Abramovitz and David (2001), the place to look for evidence would be in the macroeconomic
footprint of technological change on relative factor shares as capital-to-labour ratios change.
Here, pace Mokyr, there is some evidence in support of Allen’s view that technological
change in the industrial revolution was labour saving. Allen (2009b) offers a calibrated
model of the British economy based on a translog production function that approximately
replicates the stagnation of real wages and the rise in the share of profits in national income at
this time together with faster growth of the capital stock than the labour force. The
calibration assumes that technical change is entirely labour augmenting and has an elasticity
of substitution between capital and labour of 0.2. This is similar to the view of technological
change in nineteenth-century America offered by Abramovitz and David (2001).8
Was micro-invention really neutral? David (1975) asserted that localized learning would
have this characteristic and had technical reasons for wanting this to be the case but offered
little evidence to support his claim. Allen’s discussion of several cases offers at best mixed
support. While coke-smelting seems to fit the assumption (p. 217), micro-invention in cotton
textiles was relentlessly labour-saving (p. 184, 209) while in steam engines it actually
8 An implication is that estimates of TFP growth devised from imposition of standard Cobb-Douglas
assumptions are biased downwards. However, using the formula in Dani Rodrik (1997) indicates that the bias
is small; 0.04 and 0.17 percentage points per year in 1760-1801 and 1801-31, respectively. These numbers
reflect the slow increase in the capital to labour ratio.
8entailed a reversal of the original bias and became energy-saving (p. 177). When micro-
invention is interpreted a la Mokyr, then bias might be predicted if, for example, trying to
find point C is interpreted as factor substitution with the process of trying to convert ideas
into commercial propositions is guided by price signals (cf. David, 1975, p. 35).
If micro-invention is interpreted as a flow of incremental improvements, then it remains to be
established how far the resulting labour productivity growth was the result of passive learning
rather than investments in intangible capital or changes in physical or human capital to labour
ratios. Generally speaking, the literature on learning by doing has tended over time to think
that omitted-variables bias has inflated estimates of productivity growth from case studies of
learning-by-doing. This appears to be true in the famous cases both of Liberty ships
(Thompson, 2001) and the Lowell textile mills (Bessen, 2003; Lazonick and Brush, 1985)
although in neither case has this bias been fully purged. The bottom line seems to be that we
need to know considerably more about micro-invention and, especially, learning in order to
evaluate the competing claims of Allen and Mokyr.
Ideology, Institutional Change and Economic Reform
Mokyr stresses that the ideology of the Enlightenment had a dual impact on the First
Industrial Revolution both because it was conducive to the production of more useful
knowledge while at the same time reducing access costs and also through its effects in
improving incentive structures through promoting better economic policy and institutions.
This argument fits perfectly with endogenous growth theory in the tradition of Philippe
Aghion and Peter Howitt (1992). Once again, the issues that arise are not so much with the
logic of the argument but its empirical validity.
In terms of Figure 2, the Enlightenment would raise λ, the innovation-friendliness of the 
economy, thus shifting the Schumpeter relationship upwards and increasing the amount of
technological progress expected for any level of the capital to effective labour ratio. The
favourable impact on λ came both through lower costs of innovating and also from better 
payoffs from innovating as the process of creative destruction was facilitated and rent-
seeking opportunities were greatly reduced. Mokyr sees the breakthrough of the British
Industrial Revolution in terms of a transition to sustained technological advance and thus the
real contribution of the higher λ thanks to the Enlightenment was to underpin productivity 
growth through micro-invention (pp. 487-488).
Mokyr’s argument is much more subtle than earlier discussions of institutional change in the
context of the industrial revolution. For example, in emphasizing the effectiveness of the
parliamentary system as an agent of reforms that make markets work better he is more
convincing on how the Glorious Revolution mattered than North and Barry Weingast (1989),
in downplaying the role of the ‘deeply-flawed’ patent system (p. 410) relative to other aspects
of institutional quality he rightly dismisses the claims of North and Robert Thomas (1973),
and in focusing on the incentives for micro-invention he need not be perturbed by the
rejection of the institutional-improvement hypothesis by Greg Clark (2007) on the grounds
that many famous inventors made no money.
9Mokyr can certainly point to evidence of improvements in institutions and reductions in rent-
seeking from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries. Bogart and Richardson
(2008) noted the number of parliamentary acts that reorganized property rights numbered
about 25 per year in the 1720s compared with 175 per year in the 1820s. Forrest Capie
(2004) calculated an increase in the coefficient of contract-intensive money (defined as non-
currency money divided by total money supply), a proxy for the enforceability and security
of property rights, from 0.26 in 1790 to 0.76 in 1870. William Rubinstein’s research on
probates (1992) showed that fortunes based on exploiting rent-seeking opportunities provided
by the state were still very prominent in 1809-1839 but not thereafter.
That said, it has to be noted that Mokyr offers no quantification either of institutional quality
or its impact on technological progress and, indeed, this may not be possible, especially if
informal institutions are held to be the key; λ is unobservable. Moreover, while Mokyr can 
point to better economic policy in terms, for example, of the abolition of the Statute of
Artificers, the Bubble Act and the Usury Laws, the reform of the patent system, and the
Repeal of the Corn Laws, many of these were long-delayed. And it is easy to point to major
failures of government policy which might well disappoint those imbued with Enlightenment
views, for example, the refusal to promote state-financed primary education despite the high
social (and fiscal) rate of return it could have delivered (Lindert, 2009), the incompetent
regulation of the railway system that involved the construction of a seriously sub-optimal
network at high cost (Casson, 2009; Foreman-Peck, 1987), and the obvious shortcomings of
company law even in the second half of the nineteenth century (Cottrell, 1980). These really
seem to be the outcome of interest-group politics not evidence-based policy design.
So did Enlightenment ideology matter as much as Mokyr claims? The most serious and
quantitative debate on the role of ideology in policy reform has related to the repeal of the
Corn Laws in 1846. Using various econometric methodologies, results have differed but it
would fair to conclude that it is possible to detect roles for ideology, party affiliation and
economic interests in the crucial vote (McKeown, 1989; McLean and Bustani, 1999).
However, the ideology which is held to matter is not that of the Enlightenment. The most
sophisticated interpretation by Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) actually concludes that the
success of repeal in 1846 was based on a weakening of the role of ideology relative to
constituency economic interest within the split Tory party and the ideology in question relates
to defending traditional British institutions.
Of course, Mokyr repeatedly acknowledges qualifications to his hypothesis along similar
lines to the above and accepts that the evidence for his claims will not strike everyone as
compelling while at the same time definitely thinking that ‘the glass is half-full’. To be
convinced that the Enlightenment had the two-fold favourable impact on λ that Mokyr 
claims, requires not only that institutions and/or policy improved but also that this was driven
by ideology. In particular, this entails dropping the traditional belief that economic interests
were much more important than ideas in shaping economic reform and being able to show
that there were significant positive impacts of reforms on innovative effort. Before this
interpretation gains general acceptance, especially among those of a cliometric disposition,
more quantitative evidence will be required.
10
Concluding Comments
These books are really valuable additions to the historiography of the Industrial Revolution.
Not surprisingly, they do not solve the problem of explaining why the ideas for the famous
inventions came along where and when they did; that would be to ask too much. But they do
make progress in offering plausible ideas as to why these ideas fell on fertile ground and they
do offer important insights into what we need to know to understand how and why a
sustained and significant acceleration of technological progress took place in Britain from the
late eighteenth century onwards. Unlike Unified Growth Theory they seek to understand this
phenomenon rather than, in effect, to explain it away.
In the best argumentative traditions of the new economic history, Allen and Mokyr see their
accounts as competing. In essence, however, they are not mutually exclusive and perhaps
eventually will more appropriately be seen as complementary. It is widely accepted by
economic historians that the explanation for a sustained acceleration of productivity growth
must come from understanding the development and subsequent incremental improvement of
new technologies. Thus, a combination of Allen and Mokyr’s claims might produce the
hypothesis that this resulted from the responsiveness of agents, which was augmented by the
Enlightenment, to the wage and price configuration that underpinned the profitability of
innovative effort in the eighteenth century.
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Table 1. Internal Rate of Return on Purchase of Spinning Jenny, c. 1780 (%)
Cost of Jenny 840d 1450d 1500d
Wages
9.375d 64.0 31.0 29.5
6.25d 38.0 13.5 12.0
4.66d 24.0 2.5 1.5
3.75d 15.0 -5.0 -6.5
Notes:
England: price of jenny = 840d, wage = 6.25d (Allen, 2009, p.214)
France: price of jenny = 1450d, wage = 4.66d (Allen, 2009, p.214)
United States (Philadelphia): price of jenny = 1500d (Jeremy, 1973, p. 30), wage = 9.375d
based on 50 per cent differential with England (Adams, 1970).
Rate of return is derived from the expression
 J = Σ(wΔL – m)/(1 + r)t
where J is the price of the jenny, w is the daily wage of a spinner, m is the additional
maintenance cost of the jenny assumed to be 10% of the purchase price each year and the
lifetime of the machine is 10 years.
 ΔL is the saving of labour based on the formula 
ΔL = YD(1 – 1/P) 
Where Y is the number of days the jenny is used each year, D is the proportion of a full day
that it was used for, and P is the relative labour productivity of a spinner with the jenny
compared with the spinning wheel. Allen’s base-case assumptions are that Y = 250, D = 0.4
and P =3 so ΔL = 67. 
Source: own calculations based on these assumptions
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1a-Choice of Technology: The role of factor prices
Source: David, 1975
Po
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B
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C
Note: K is capital, L is labour and APF is the available production techniques frontier. The
dotted lines P0P0 and P1P1 are isocost lines at different relative factor prices. At P1 (P0)
relative factor prices, point A (B) on the Available Process Frontier will be chosen.
Compared with these original points, C is on a lower (higher) isocost line at P1 (P0) relative
factor prices.
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1b-Technical progress: Localised change
Source: David, 1975
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Note: from point C neutral localized learning proceeds down the α ray towards the origin. 
Eventually, this technology will be preferred at both sets of relative factor prices if there is no
progress down the β ray.  Following David (1975), Broadberry and Gupta (2009) suggest that 
progress down the α ray will be much faster than down the β ray. 
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Figure 2: Endogenous Growth
Schumpeter (low λ) 
Solow relationship
^k^
X
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X2
Schumpeter relationship (high λ) 
Source: based on Carlin and Soskice (2006)
Note: the rate of technological change is on the vertical axis and the capital to effective
labour ratio on the horizontal axis. The Solow relationship captures the steady-state
relationship between capital intensity and the rate of technological change for a given savings
ratio. The Schumpeter relationship captures the standard assumption of endogenous-
innovation growth models. Higher λ represents an economic environment that is more 
conducive to innovation, for example, because institutions are better, R & D is more
productive because of a better science base, etc..
